

# Arbitration, European competition law and public order

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# Introduction (1)

- Arbitration: narrow sense: «French: arbitrage juridictionnel » or « voluntary arbitration » (portuguese law 2011), and no all types of ADR, such as mediation, conciliation..., which raise other issues
- EU Competition Law:
  - on most topics NCL raise the same type of issues
  - EU competition law = not only, antitrust (art. 101 & 102 TFEU), but also mergers and State aids

## Introduction (2)

\* All these rules are mandatory

Is there some place for arbitration?

the « public order Damocles' sword »

\* Two main obstacles:

- Concept of « public order » very broad, different meanings
- Furthermore, in CL, major distinction between public and private enforcement

## Introduction (3)

- **Different role of arbitration in public and private enforcement**
  - Public enforcement: the task of the Commission and the NCA very few place for arbitration, but possible for a CA to introduce arbitration to monitor the commitments: specific issues (see, *Concurrences* 1 / 2012).
  - Private enforcement: the task of national courts (« juges de droit commun »)

# Introduction (4)

- The role of the national court is always the same:
  - Apply competition rules as any rule of law and draw the « civil » consequences of the infringement, but
  - With different extent according to the component of EU competition law (*ex post* vs *ex ante* controls)
- An arbitration tribunal cannot have more powers than a national court, but should not have less powers

# Introduction (5)

- Public order and the use of arbitration in EU CL (I)
- Public order and the application of EU CL by the arbitrator (II)
- Public order and the control of the award (III)

# I. Public order and use of arbitration in EU CL

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1. Well-known issues
2. New issues

# I.1. Classical issues

- Two meanings of « Public order »
  - In EU competition law (and NL) = exclusive jurisdiction of CA
  - In some N arb. Laws ( F ex.) = the « public order clause » on arbitrability of claims

## I. 1. Classical issues (1):

### *Public order and exclusive jurisdiction of CA*

**Exclusive jurisdiction of CA for public enforcement  
(detect, sue and punish antitrust violations;  
determine compatibility of merger and State aids)**

- In ex ante controls: Reg. N° 139/2004 and State Aids

Few room for arbitration, but not excluded (already discussed in some cases)

- Breach of the duty to notify: Merger and Aids
- Other specific issues: ancillary restraints in Mergers, restitution in Aids

# I. 1. Classical issues (1): *Public order and exclusive jurisdiction of CA*

- In ex post control (art. 101 & 102 TFEU)

More room for arbitration: all civil consequences (validity of all legal acts (*actes juridiques*; not only contracts) and damages)

Enlarged by the regulation n° 1/2003 due to the adoption of the legal exception system and the suppression of the Commission 's exclusive jurisdiction for individual exemptions

## I.1. Classical issues (2):

### *The « public policy clause » of Nat. Arbitration Laws*

- **Old issue of « arbitrability »** in some N arb. laws, such as France (art. 2060 civ. c.; see also, Belgium)
  - Lot of discussion in the eighties....
  - Closed by a decision of the Paris Court of appeals (Labinal, case, 1993), not directly by the Cour de cassation for EU CL but recently confirmed (Cass. civ. 1<sup>ère</sup>, 8 July 2010), for title IV on restrictive practices
  - Reform of arbitration law in January 2011 (no change for constitutional reasons)

## I.2. New issues

New context: development of damages actions for violation of articles 101 & 102 TFEU. Consequences on arbitrability.

- Damages
  - compensatory damages: OK, only issue with the scope of the arbitration agreement
  - but, what if punitive damages are introduced (not at the european level, but only in some MS)? In some MS, a foreign judgment which gives treble damages is deemed to be contrary to public order

The US counter example: waiver of treble damages discussed

- Plurality of defendants; collective redress

## II. Public order and the application of EU Competition Law by the arbitral tribunal

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1. Substantive issues
2. Procedural issues

## II. 1. Substantive issues

EU competition rules: mandatory rules

In a situation where articles 101 and/ or 102 are applicable (effects in EU + effect on trade between MS) (to be noted: caselaw on spatial application of art. L-442-I-5<sup>o</sup> in French law)

- In domestic arbitrations: no specific issue; EU rules = integral part of national law
- In international arbitration: applicable law (according to the choice of the parties or of the arbitrators)

Regulations « Rome I » and « Rome II » not compulsory, but can be taken into account

- **the applicable law is a MS law**; no specific issue; application of EU CL well admitted by arbitral tribunals, in contractual matters
- **the applicable law is a Non EU State law**; is there a duty or not to apply EU competition rules? Depends on the recognition of the theory of mandatory rules (« théorie des lois de police »)

The *Ingmar* (ECJ, 2000) precedent but in another context

## II.2. Procedural issues

- Impact of an « amiable composition clause »?: no (Swiss exception)
- **Silence of the parties on competition issues:** Should the arbitrator raise *ex officio* the issue of competition law?
  - Nothing prevents to do as long as there is a contradictory discussion on the competition issue
  - Is it a duty? Discussion. *Eco Swiss* (1999)  
but *Mostaza Claro* (2006) and *Asturcom* (2009) in consumer cases (for personal position, see comments in Rev. arb.)

# III. Public order and the control of the award

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Well-known discussion since the famous *EcoSwiss* case (CJ1999), but renewed since *Thalès* case (F.2004) and many other national cases; lot of litterature

1. Existence of the control
2. Reality of the control

## III.1. Existence of the control (1)

- **Legal basis**

In all texts (either international; N.Y convention; national laws)

Provisions on the control of the award through the recognition and enforcement procedures

Public order may intervene at two levels:

- Validity of the arbitration agreement; *Mitsubishi* case (1985), but in the very specific US context, and no more discussion on arbitrability (except maybe on specific points)
- Compatibility of the award with public order

## III.1. Existence of the control (2)

- **The criteria**
- **What is public order in arbitration laws?**
  - domestic arbitration, no issue; always public order of required State
  - international arbitration? Sometimes, « international public order » (F. art. 1520-5<sup>o</sup> Proc. Civ. C.), but no difference; always conception of the required State
- **Is there a special status for EU public order? *Eco Swiss***

## III.1. Existence of the control (3)

- **For a MS court, shall EU public order be stricter than national public order? *Eco Swiss***
  - « minimalist approach »: exactly the same
  - But can be discussed: need to have a uniform system
- + *Eco Swiss* case; no discussion on competition issues, what about the duty to raise *ex officio* (pt 40)
- + *Marketing Displays case* (N, 2005): contract with foreign law applicable; award outside EU, but enforcement in EU

## III.1. Existence of the control (4)

- **For NMS court, is it possible not to take into account EU public order?** *Terra Armata* case (CH, Fed. Sup. Ct, 2006); award which refuses to take into account art. 101 TFEU not contrary to the Swiss international public order. Very critical decision (against a previous caselaw of 1992)
- Competition lawyer's view: existence of an agreement worldwide on the need of CL, specially on hard-core cartels
- PIL lawyer's view: applicable law was Italian law.. And what about theory of mandatory laws?

## III.2. Reality of the control (1)

- **What is a violation of EU public order?** Caselaw in MS (F (*Thalès, Cytec, Linde*), B (*Cytec*), N (*Marketing Displays*), G, I (*Terra Armata*)).
  - In the EU, different methods:
    - + either, true control: N, G, I, B (sometimes critical)
    - + either very limited control: F, violation « flagrante, effective et concrète », (confirmed for EU law *Cass. civ. 1<sup>ère</sup>, June 2011, Sté Smeg*); = no control!
  - May lead to contradictory solutions; the *Cytec* case, but happy end

## III.2. Extent of the control (2)

### What is the point of view of the competition lawyer?

No general rule, but distinctions

- **Control within the EU**; true issue is not between maximalist and minimalist... but whether or not the competition issue has been discussed
  - + If discussed (*Cytec*): no discussion on the merits; obvious violation is enough
  - + If no discussion (*Thalès, Linde*): no discussion = obvious violation; contrary to the EU caselaw. Duty to raise ex officio

## III.2. Extent of the control (3)

- **Control outside EU:** theory of mandatory rules may help to solve the issue with next countries, which share the same conception of competition rules (EEE, Ch, candidates)

# Conclusion

Many theoretical discussion

But globally, it works

And if it was no more true, the CA may intervene....

*Thank you for your attention*